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ABSTRACT
What is the political feasibility of a peacetime draft? Throughout this
nation's history, the military manning debate has focused upon two separate
schools of thought. On the one hand, there are those who believe that a
"professional" force, comprised of experienced, career military personnel, is
needed for national defense. At the same time, others have argued that a
force composed of armed citizens is the best expression of democratic, "citizen-
soldier" ideals. A return to conscription has been proposed as the best means
of remedying the deficiencies resulting from a market-based recruiting
system. However, the fact is that Americans are quite satisfied with the
current system (according to a 1984 survey). This thesis seeks to place the
draft revival question within the framework of the philosophical and histori-
cal issues that have helped to shape the nation's attitudes toward military
service. A major conclusion of the study is that political acceptability of a
peacetime draft in the United States is highly questionable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As soon as public service ceases to be the main business of the citizens,
and they prefer to serve with their pocket-books rather than with their
persons, the State is already close to ruin. [Ref. l:p. 17]
Rousseau
Nations depend upon armed force to ensure their security. Yet, in a
liberal, pluralistic society such as the United States, the requirements for
military service greatly tax a political system that must both safeguard indi-
vidual liberties and provide the manpower necessary to support an effective
system of defense. As the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) celebrates its fifteenth
anniversary, it remains the focus of controversy, highlighting this country's
persistent failure to devise a form of peacetime military service that is uni-
versally popular. [Ref. l:p. 15]
A. PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF A PEACETIME DRAFT
What is the political feasibility of a peacetime draft? A return to con-
scription has been proposed as the best means of remedying the deficiencies
resulting from a market-based recruiting system [Ref. 2:p. 3]. However, the
social and budgetary implications of a new draft remain unclear. Despite the
legitimate political concerns associated with an all-volunteer military, the fact
is that Americans are quite satisfied with the current system (according to a
1984 survey) [Ref. 2:pp. 4, 10].
Achieving a popular consensus on the subject of a peacetime draft is
increasingly difficult because the modern view of military duty is formed by a
variety of issues, both philosophical and empirical. To produce a politically
and socially acceptable system, policy makers must have a grasp of the prac-
tical as well as ideological issues that color society's perceptions of military
service. This chapter offers a brief synopsis of the various issues that have
influenced America's approach to manning the military. A more in-depth dis-
cussion of the topic is presented in the subsequent chapters.
B. THE CITIZEN-SOLDIER DEBATE
Throughout this nation's history, the military manning debate has
focused upon two separate schools of thought. On the one hand, there are
those who believe that a "professional" force, comprised of experienced career,
military personnel, is needed for national defense. At the same time, others
have argued that a force composed of armed citizens is the best expression of
democratic, "citizen-soldier" ideals.
The ongoing debate in this country can be traced to colonial times.
Alexander Hamilton and George Washington admired the highly-trained pro-
fessionalism of Prussian soldiers, and thus lobbied for a standing military
presence [Ref. l:pp. 4-7]. In fact, Washington's distaste for the armed masses,
the citizen-soldiers, was so great he voiced his hope "that no reliance, except
such as may arise from necessity, should ever be had in them again"
[Ref. 3:p. 5]. The political realities of the period would force Washington to
temper his views. He eventually came to recognize the country's deep-seated
fear of a permanent military and the inability of the young nation to support
a standing force [Ref. 3:p. 11].
The majority of post-revolutionary statesmen, the most notable being
Thomas Jefferson, drew upon their recent colonial experiences, as well as the
ideals of Enlightenment thinkers, to form a rigid distrust of standing armies.
These individuals preferred the use of armed citizens to fulfill defense needs.
In fact, some writers and statesmen of the period feared that large standing
Armies composed of professional soldiers posed a threat to democracy. Inter-
estingly, this aversion to a powerful military remains with this country today.
[Ref. 2:p. 17]
C. THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE
Even the jackal does not hire someone to defend its young.
George S. Patton [Ref. 2:p. 125]
The social and political concerns framing the current military service
debate are essentially the same ones that preoccupied this country's fore-
fathers. What follows is a discussion of the major issues that shape current
discussion of the all-volunteer military's social "acceptability." Each issue
reflects a question that has puzzled American governments since colonial
times: how should a democracy most equitably distribute among its citizens
the burdens of national defense?
With the introduction of the AVF in 1973, many individuals believed the
United States had finally produced a long-term solution to the controversy of
military service. The current force was born out of the anti-draft negativism
caused by the Vietnam War, yet it was the product of a positive ideal [Ref.
4:pp. 248-249]. A voluntary force would blend the higher purpose of the
citizen-soldier with the effectiveness of a professional force. Ideally, the All-
Volunteer Force would use the "invisible hand" of the nation's economy,
rather than the iron hand of the draft board to draw citizens to serve their
country.
In many ways, the AVF is a success. In terms of qualitative measures,
such as educational level and mental aptitude, the current military may be
better than any force ever assembled under the draft. Indeed,
DoD officials maintain that today's volunteer force is the most capable
in our nation's history in terms of aptitude and education and that
recent research indicates a comparably effective draft force would cost
more than today's volunteer force. [Ref. 3:p. 4]
Yet, to some, the current force is an ideological failure that has squandered
this nation's store of patriotism and civic virtue. This line of thinking is cap-
tured in the "institution" versus "occupation" model developed by Charles C.
Moskos. He observes that a conscripted force appeals to the "traditional"
values of civic duty and citizen responsibility; whereas the AVF depends
heavily upon economic incentives to draw and retain personnel. As a result,
the AVF has turned military service into "just another job" rather than a
national responsibility and a way of life. [Ref. 5:p. 137]
Others maintain that the policy of voluntary, money-based service may
jeopardize the "political legitimacy" of the nation's armed forces, proving
there are times
...when the public interest is not served simply by letting individuals
act in free markets [Ref. 6:p. 287].
The "type" of person attracted by the AVF has also been a focus of criti-
cism. To some,
the all-volunteer force has purchased the...economically marginal man
rather than acquiring people who are broadly representative of the
country's citizens [Ref. 6:p. 290].
That is to say, the current market-based system of military manning has
hired individuals who choose military service mainly because it is an
"employer of last resort" or the best option in a world of limited economic
choices. Much of the discussion surrounding the "broad cross section of
citizens" issue is captured in the concept of social representation.
1. Social Representation
Military representation issues can be grouped into three broad
categories:
• political legitimacy
• military effectiveness
• social equity [Ref. 7:p. 403].
These issues are explored in detail in the sections that follow.
a. Political Legitimacy
Embedded in the notion of a "politically legitimate" force is the
belief that the military should be filled with "citizen-soldiers who can recreate
the social fabric of American life." [Ref. 8:p. 1-7] In an ideal sense, citizen-
soldiers provide the best hope for a democracy's defense because individuals
who possess the greatest stake in a country's survival will prove to be its most
vigorous defenders.
(1) Soldiering and Citizenship
Historically, the United States, borrowing from European
experience, has identified the requirement to bear arms with the notion of
citizenship. This belief has served to ease the social dislocation caused by a
demand for military service because citizens viewed military duty as payment
for the benefits of citizenship [Ref. 4:p. 73]. In the wake of Vietnam, the
concept of a citizen's responsibility to bear peacetime arms has lost its allure.
This erosion is evidenced by the failure of the volunteer force "to attract a
sufficient number of youth from the middle and upper classes into the
enlisted ranks" [Ref. 2:p. 14] Indeed, this lack of participation has prompted
some scholars to question society's commitment to the principle of military
service as payment for citizenship.
(2) Broad Representation
In the eyes of some manpower analysts, the lack of broad
class participation has produced a force that is "not socially or racially repre-
sentative of the country" [Ref. 2:p. 14]. In 1987, blacks represented greater
than 23 percent of enlisted army recruits as compared to a civilian youth pop-
ulation figure of nearly 15 percent [Ref. 8:p. 11-37]. It is the overrepresenta-
tion of blacks that prompted Morris Janowitz, a prominent sociologist, to
challenge the legitimacy of the force and raise the question of whether
...a political democracy [can] expect a legitimate form of government if
its military is not broadly representative of society? [Ref. 4:p. 284].
Race and social class are the most often cited measures of
an army's legitimacy, yet representation issues extend beyond "numbers and
ratios and statistical summaries." [Ref. 7:p. XTV] Perhaps staffing a military
force does make a statement about this country's fundamental beliefs and the
devotion of its people to the responsibilities of citizen service. If this is the
case, legitimacy cannot be calculated by simple comparing statistics to the
general population. As John Kester points out, "the issue is not one of price
but of principle." [Ref. 6:p. 290]
(3) "Perfect Representation"
Certainly, the achievement of a "perfectly" representative
military is an illusion. Maintenance of a "perfectly" representative force
would require the recruitment of all segments of society: the aged, the infirm,
the unstable, those of lesser intellect. Such a "representative" force would
obviously impair military effectiveness, raising the question of whether the
perfectly represented, politically legitimate force would be able to defend the
absolutely 'legitimate" body politic. [Ref. 9:p. 243] The issue of social repre-
sentation is complicated and difficult to define; yet, some individuals main-
tain it must be addressed. This is because they believe the Armed Forces are
more than just a means of defense. As one military manpower specialist
observes,
The Military has...become a symbol of the society, a manifestation of
equality; and as a public institution, the composition of the military is
seen to symbolically reflect social justice or social injustice. [Ref.
7:p. 106]
b. Military Effectiveness
The ultimate mission of any military organization is deterring
and fighting a war. This fact prompts some individuals to cast aside social
and political considerations and focus only on defense requirements. One
participant at a recent Hoover Institute Conference on the draft summarized
this viewpoint when he stated: "The object of creating an army is not to be
fair, it is not to be economical. It is to fight a war." [Ref. 10:p. 148] Perhaps,
this view is shared by the Department of Defense (DoD). Currently, "the mili-
tary services do not attempt to regulate the demographic characteristics of
new recruits" but rather, seeks "to recruit 'most of the best' young men and
women available each year." [Ref. 7:pp. IV-2, IV-3] Selected recruits are
labeled "the best" on the basis of particular qualities such as education, apti-
tude, and physical fitness. As long as qualified candidates are granted equal
access to all positions without reference to demographic qualities, issues of
equity are not addressed. [Ref. 7:p. IX]
The issue of military effectiveness complicates the representa-
tion issue. It is true that without effective forces political legitimacy and
social equity can neither be protected nor maintained. This fact must be
somehow balanced with the more philosophical view that "without equity or
legitimacy there is nothing worth protecting." [Ref. 9:p. 406]
c. Social Equity
An equitable system of military service ensures that the
"benefits and burdens (or rights and responsibilities) of national defense are
distributed proportionately throughout society." [Ref. 7:p. 1-4] The overrep-
resentation of minorities in the enlisted ranks brings into question the
current military's fulfillment of this objective.
Many individuals question why citizens who share the smallest
portion of this nation's resources should have to shoulder more than their
share of national defense. In the eyes of some analysts, the world's guardian
of democracy is fast becoming a society in which underprivileged members are
forced to defend everyone else. [Ref. 5:p. 298]
Others discount the need for burden sharing and point to the
"benefits" gained by those who select military service. Military service has
always been viewed as a path of social mobility for all individuals, perhaps to
an even greater extent for lower socioeconomic groups. Indeed, those who
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choose to serve have access to many benefits not otherwise found in civilian
life. In fact, studies have shown military training better prepares minority
candidates for civilian jobs, "enabling them in the long term to earn more
than their peers who did not serve." [Ref. ll:p. 39]
Discussions of equity give rise to still another "draft versus
AVF" issue: the "tax" associated with military service.
2. The Draft and the Conscription Tax
Basically, the conscription "tax" represents "the difference between
the wage that would induce an inductee or draft-motivated enlistee to volun-
teer and the actual draft wage." [Ref. 12:p. 81] The conscription tax has a
significant effect on the concept of equitable military service. The tax not only
redistributes income from those that serve to those that do not serve (foregone
civilian wages), but it also lowers the military wage. [Ref. 12:pp. 87-89]
Mandatory military service allows the government to pay a below-market
wage, thus shifting the burden of payment for military service away from the
taxpayer to the inductee. This payment affects different socioeconomic groups
in different ways.
Individuals who have higher-paying civilian job opportunities "pay"
the conscription tax in the form of forfeited civilian wages. This form of tax
becomes an especially volatile social issue since not all draft-eligible individu-
als are required to serve. When the possibility of legally escaping service
exists, individuals who possess the most lucrative job opportunities would be
expected "to spend more to avoid payment of the conscript tax." [Ref. 12:p. 87]
As stated above, conscription enables the government to pay a
reduced military wage. This below-market wage places a hardship upon the
disadvantaged draftee to whom a military career may represent the best hope
for a well-paying job. Indeed, by paying individuals less than they would
accept if they could voluntarily serve, lower income groups also pay a "tax."
[Ref. 12:p. 89]
The introduction of the AVF shifted emphasis away from the con-
scription tax to a different sort of equity issue: "economic conscription."
3. The AVF and Economic Conscription
Draft-era deferments caused the nation's lower classes to assume a
large portion of the conscription burden. It has been said that today's all-
volunteer military perpetuates the problem by "economically conscripting"
those who are less-skilled and have minimum employment prospects. [Ref.
9:p. 143]
The phenomenon of economic conscription can produce unsettling
results. It is accepted that most young people will not select the military as a
first choice of employment. It follows, then, that individuals with more job
alternatives will opt to shun the military and let the defense burden fall upon
those who have narrower job choices. [Ref. 13 :p. 81] According to John
Kester, this has resulted in a manning policy that displays class-based dis-
crimination [Ref. 6:p. 299], A perception of class-based discrimination result-
ing from economic conscription can contribute to the problem of social
imbalance. If the AVF becomes viewed as an employer of last resort for the
poor and disadvantaged, white middle-class youths may forego the armed
forces as a legitimate and realistic job alternative. [Ref. 7:p. 143]
Additionally, some scholars have raised the issue of the "tipping
effect." This is a situation in which the percentage of minorities becomes so
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high that whites are no longer willing to enter military service. In effect, "the
more the armed forces become disproportionately composed of the poor and
minorities, the greater is the likelihood they will stay that way." [Ref.
7:p. 144]
D. WILL AMERICANS SUPPORT A PEACETIME DRAFT?
In a democracy, the survival of public policy depends on popular accep-
tance. As a result, any plan for returning to a peacetime draft must be devel-
oped within the framework of political and societal perceptions
—
perceptions
that are deeply rooted in the past.
The next three chapters expand upon the ideas presented here. Chapter
II examines the European military experience, because many of American
military beliefs have their beginnings in Europe. Chapter III begins with a
discussion of the major philosophical influences that have helped to shape
this country's civil-military relations. The European experiences discussed in
Chapter II are then used to trace the American military tradition from the
seventeenth to the twentieth-century.
Chapter IV shifts the focus from the past to the present and discusses
some of the current issues that affect the political feasibility of a return to a
draft.
11
IL EUROPEAN MILITARY INFLUENCE
The modern professional armies of Western Europe emerged from the
post feudal institutions created in the eighteenth-century by the abso-
lute monarchies. The military institutions of the United States were
deeply influenced by these developments. [Ref. 7:p. 71]
It has been said that today's events are constrained by the customs
formed in the past [Ref. 14:p. XX]. This fact, combined with the role Europe
played in creating and populating this nation, makes the study of the Euro-
pean military experience highly instructive. This chapter begins with an
overview of the evolution of the citizen-soldier concept in Europe from the
fifteenth-century through the French Revolution. The chapter then examines
the writings of two famous military theorists who have influenced American
military thought.
A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CITIZEN-SOLDIER
...military institutions have been of central importance in fashioning
the type of nation-states that emerged in Western Europe and the
United States. The role of the military is linked to nationalism; in fact,
the armed forces of the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries epitomize
modern nationalism [Ref. 7:p. 74].
This chapter addresses three questions:
• What are the ways that the compositions of early European societies
are reflected in the organization of their armed forces?
• What are the roles of nationalism and of citizenship in the evolution
of the citizen-soldier concept and, ultimately, in the formation of
political democracies?
• How have the writings of Jomini and Clausewitz shaped the
"American" approach toward military service?
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Studies of nationalism often begin with the French Revolution of 1789.
Observers view this "people's revolution" as the beginning of the fusion of a
government and its people, and the emergence of modern nation states as we
know them. It is this unity that serves as the very essence of nationalism. To
appreciate the scope of political change caused by the French Revolution,
however, it is necessary to be aware of the military-citizenship connection
preceding the conflict.
1. Feudal Armies
Prior to the French Revolution, war was primarily a struggle
between rulers rather than a contest between peoples [Ref. 15:p. 91-92]. The
organization of armies reflected this separation between rulers and their sub-
jects. Military duty was restricted to a narrow class of landholding knights
who regarded military service as the price to be paid for accepting land from
their overlord [Ref. 16:p. 15]. The harnessing of broad social energy, which
was to prove pivotal to the success of future European and American armies,
was not present in the feudal military systems. Subjects (as opposed to citi-
zens) did not have a stake in the success or failure of their social organization,
and thus were not called upon to defend it.
During this period, a strict value system and legal standard bound
soldiers together [Ref. 16:p. 13]. This strict code of honor would change with
the rise of the moneyed economy, a change which heralded the end of the
feudal order and permanently altered systems of military service.
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2. Sixteenth-Century Florence
a. The Moneyed Economy
Beginning in sixteenth-century Europe, governments began
accepting money payments in lieu of actual military service. The use of
dollars rather than "duty" as a means of inducing service gave rise to a new
type of soldier: the mercenary. The use of financial incentives to encourage
military service broadened the recruiting base. Monetary incentives also
changed the "type" of soldier by attracting men who were not tied to the
feudal military traditions [Ref. 16:p. 14]. Armies were now manned by
"adventurers and ruffians who wanted wealth and plunder." [Ref. 16:p. 14]
The soldiers of this period were not representative of society; in fact, "in the
most civilized parts of Europe, such as Italy, people looked with contempt on
soldiers and soldiering." [Ref. 16:p. 15]
Concurrent with the growth of the mercenary defense force
was the rise of the middle class. It is the development of the moneyed class
that forever extinguished feudal life and served as the beginning of the mili-
tary service-citizenship connection. For it is with the rise of the middle class
that the notion of citizenship began to develop. Slowly, individuals began to
connect their personal well-being with the prosperity of the state.
6. The Beginnings ofa Modern Political-Military Bond
The writings of Machiavelli, Florence's great statesman and
political philosopher, characterize the revolutionary social, political, and mili-
tary changes that occurred during the sixteenth-century. Machiavelli
espoused the "close connection and interrelationship between political and
military institutions" [Ref. 16:p. 27], and was one of the first individuals to
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recognize the tie between "the changes that occurred in military organizations
and the revolutionary developments that took place in the social and political
sphere." [Ref. 16:p. 11]
Recognizing the political-military link, Machiavelli attempted
to connect more closely the political and military institutions of his time. He
advocated conscription in an attempt to eliminate Florence's dependance on
hired soldiers. Machiavelli also led the organizations of militia.
One of Machiavelli's most important insights was derived from
his study of the ancient Romans and Greeks. He asserted that "the defense of
a state [is] the task not of a special privileged group but should be the concern
of all those who live in the same society." [Ref. 16:p. 29] Perhaps, it was this
sixteenth-century philosopher who was the first to conceptualize
"representation" as a measure of an army's political legitimacy.
3. The "Ancien Regime"
a. The Dynastic State
Although Florentine armies showed the beginnings of the rise
of the political-military connection, the eighteenth-century armies of Russia,
Austria, and Prussia remained limited by their dynastic form of government.
Because the aristocratic class held great power, rulers of this period could
never fully harness the productive energies of their states. The military power
of the privileged class was evidenced by its almost exclusive control over offi-
cer commissions. [Ref. 15:p. 92] This influence severely limited the recruit-
ment base. In fact, during this period, "Officers...[had] to come from a heredi-
tary class that rarely exceeded two percent of the population." [Ref. 15:p. 92]
The societies of the"Ancien Regime" were characterized by a split between the
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government and its people. Indeed, "between populations as a whole and their
governments little feelings existed." [Ref. 15:p. 92] According to R. R. Palmer,
a noted historian, the government's expectations of their people (as opposed to
citizens) reflected this lack of unity. The peasants were expected to pay taxes
and display a measure of loyalty to their rulers. The masses were not
expected to display "unity as a nation...or to put forth a supreme effort in
war." [Ref. 15:p. 92] The government was expected to leave the masses to
their own devices, be it a time ofpeace or war. [Ref. 15:p. 92]
The armies of this period mirrored the class-conscious societies
they protected. The military was organized according to social status. Officers
identified with their noble heritage and sought "honor. . .glory or ambition"
rather than military effectiveness. [Ref. 15:p. 92] The social status of rank-
and-file soldiers and soldiering was reflected in recruiting tactics, which
focused upon drawing men from the lowest sectors of the nation. Basically,
soldiers were looked upon with contempt and were thought incapable of
believing in or fighting for something bigger than themselves. [Ref. 15 :p. 92]
b. Prussia
The eighteenth-century saw Frederick the Great rise to power.
It also witnessed the birth of a Prussian state as a great power in Europe.
Prussia is of particular interest because its very existence depended upon
military strength [Ref. 15:p. 97].
The extensive writings of Frederick the Great offer the oppor-
tunity for an in-depth analysis of the Prussian military-political regime. His
work is especially relevant, because, in addition to being the best army of
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the'ancien regime," the Prussian military is thought to best exemplify the
social characteristics of the time [Ref. l:p. 46].
Study of Prussia's armed forces demonstrates how an army can
mirror the nation's social order. Indeed, it shows how, given the social con-
straints of the time, "long service by conscripted or volunteer peasants,
foreigners, and adventurers [and] leadership by a cast of Nobels
—
[makes]
sense." [Ref. l:p. 49]
As with other dynastic regimes, the Prussian state was
characterized by a political schism between the ruling and working classes.
Soldiers felt no great identification with the state and had to be controlled by
regimentation and exacting discipline. This highly regimented fighting force
required years of training, making long periods of service (ten to twelve years)
a military necessity. [Ref. l:pp. 46, 49]
This lack of unity between a state and its people had an influ-
ence on the Prussian strategy for fighting wars. Frederick realized his troops
did not possess a higher sense of purpose that would carry them through a
war of attrition. As a result, it was felt that protracted combat had to be
avoided at all cost. [Ref. 15:p. 102]
Staffing of the Prussian army reflects a combination of the
economic and political realities of the time. As with other armies serving
dynastic governments, the Prussian military was characterized by a rigid
class structure. The Officer Corps was composed of the aristocratic class
because "peasants were clearly too ignorant to become officers." [Ref. 15:p. 97]
It was also believed that, unlike lower classes, men of privilege could be
trusted to protect the ruling order [Ref. l:p. 50].
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In eighteenth-century Prussia the middle class was usually
exempted from military duty. In fact, "merchants, artisans and manufactur-
ers" [Ref. l:p. 46] were specifically excluded from service. Frederick realized
the importance of a strong economy to the success of a military state and
believed the talents of the middle class could best be exploited by their contri-
butions to national wealth. Since Frederick believed only one percent of the
population could be drawn into military duty without hurting the economy, he
was forced to look to other sources for his military manpower. [Ref. l:p. 120]
Frederick's choice of foreign mercenaries as his manpower
resource further cemented the separation between the soldier and the
government. By 1786, the proportion of foreign soldiers filling Prussian ranks
had risen to more than 40 percent of the force [Ref. l:p. 45]. It would be
unrealistic to expect this type of force to fight out of political will or civic
pride. When the patriotic fire of the French revolutionary force is compared to
a mercenary force, it becomes easy to appreciate the true "revolution" in war-
fare introduced by the French in 1789.
4. The French Revolution
The modern concept of the citizen-soldier was made a reality with
the French Revolution. To the French political philosophers of the time, "the
theme of the citizen army was a common doctrine;" and "as a safeguard
against tyranny, the citizens of a country must be trained to arms." [Ref.
15:p. 107] The "people's war" exemplifies the powers of nationalism, the join-
ing of the political wills of a government and its people. It is this act of unity
that allows political institutions to legitimately demand the services of the
nation's citizen-soldiers and thus harness the tremendous energy of a people
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committed to their country. This energy was captured in revolutionary France
with the introduction in 1793 of the levee en masse, "which provided for the
conscription of all unmarried men age 18 to 25, without exception or
substitution." [Ref. l:p. 50] The levee en masse ensured broad-based partici-
pation in the new military and sent a clear message to the world about the
strong political will of the French republic.
The levee en masse of 1793 revealed the beginnings of a modern
citizen-soldier. Now a soldier's
...interests could be expressed in national rather than dynastic terms
[it is with this] willingness to accept huge casualties, and the freedom
and enthusiasm of the individual soldier... [that]...the state was able as
never before to exploit the energies of society for war. [Ref. 17:p. 32]
Palmer underscores the significance of the French Revolution by
stating that "the military revolution was at bottom a political revolution."
[Ref. 15:p. 119] According to Palmer, the strong identity of a people with
their nation was the power behind the war's success. Since the government
was formed by the citizenry, the political leadership had a tremendous
license, unlike dynastic rulers, to fully exploit all of the country's resources.
In Palmer's eyes, with the French Revolution, "the wars of kings were over"
and "the wars of peoples had begun." [Ref. 15:p. 119]
The modern concept of the citizen-soldier was born with the French
Revolution. The modern concept of the study of war was born of two nine-
teenth-century military men, Karl von Clausewitz and Henri, Baron de
Jomini.
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B. JOMINI AND CLAUSEWTTZ
The writings of Jomini and Clausewitz, still influence modern-day mili-
tary thought. As a result, a review of their work will help to understand the
current American perceptions of military service.
1. Jomini
Jomini's military theories have exercised great influence upon the
formation of the American attitude toward war and strategy. For, "it was
Jomini not Clausewitz, that American soldiers of the nineteenth-century read
as the foremost interpreter of war." [Ref. 3:p. 57]
Although Jomini does not specifically address military manning
issues, his thoughts on war in general are pertinent to studies of military
manning policy. It is widely known that the method of fighting a war often
dictates the type and amount of required manpower.
Jomini's basic premise was "that strategy is the key to warfare; that
all strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles." [Ref. 19:p. 146]
With his dependance upon clinical, carefully planned military strategy,
Jomini removed political and social considerations from the military arena. In
Jomini's view, the "new" way of fighting, displayed by the power of the French
Revolution, was diminished in deference to the scientifically-superior notion
of strategy. [Ref. 18:p. 145]
The Jominian approach to civil-military relations was appealing to
American professional soldiers. In total contrast to Clausewitz (discussed
below), Jomini advocated a separation between political and military leader-
ship. Jomini provided "good arguments against strict [military] subordination
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to political authority." [Ref. 18:p. 161] In Jomini's view, war-fighting and
planning should be left to soldiers, not to politicians [Ref. 18:p. 161].
2. Clausewitz
The Clausewitzian approach to war stands in complete contrast to
that of Jomini. Where Jomini viewed the study of war as a quantifiable
science, Clausewitz likened its abstractness "with the study of painting; both
concern activities that demand specific technical expertise, but whose pro-
cesses and outcome are not predictable." [Ref. 17:p. 187]
War, according to Clausewitz, went far beyond strategy to encom-
pass violence and the passion of the people, military talent and determina-
tion, and, finally, politics. In contrast to Jomini, Clausewitz did not advocate
the transfer of political leadership to military professionals in time of war.
Rather, Clausewitz tasked the government with capturing the political will of
the people and the army with carrying out that political will [Ref. 17:p. 201].
Clausewitz's famous statement that "war is nothing but the continuation of
policy with other means," [Ref. 17:p. 197] typifies his view that war is essen-
tially a political rather than a military act. [Ref. 17:p. 206]
Clausewitz's assertion that "the passions that are to be kindled in
war must already be inherent in the people" [Ref. 17:p. 395] helps to explain
the ideological component of the current draft-revival issue. Some scholars
fear that the AVF may not represent a broad cross-section of the country's
social and political "passion," and they consequently question its ability to
fight a war. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk addresses this point in his
assessment of the Vietnam experience.
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We never made an effort to create a war psychology in the United
States during the Vietnam affair....We tried to do in cold blood perhaps
what can only be done in hot blood, when sacrifices of this order are
involved. [Ref. l:p 107]
Critics of the AVF worry that a voluntary system of military service
cannot effectively tap the "hot blood" of the citizenry and thus continue their
efforts to revive compulsory service.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter explains the evolution of European armies from the
fifteenth-century to the French Revolution. An understanding of the evolu-
tionary process is important because this nation's forefathers were greatly
influenced by Europe's military experiences. The next chapter traces the
philosophical component and the history of the"American" military experi-
ence. The study is conducted in an effort to better understand the current
social forces that will influence public acceptance or rejection of a peacetime
draft.
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III. THE AMERICAN MILITARY EXPERIENCE
A. WILL 'TRADITION' PROMPT ACCEPTANCE OF A DRAFT?
Political leadership can often turn to the concept of "tradition" when
seeking to solve a difficult social problem. Unfortunately, policy makers do
not have the luxury of calling on "tradition" to settle issues of military service.
This is because study of an American military experience ultimately reveals
that this country doesn't have one. In fact the only tradition of military ser-
vice this country does possess is a legacy of controversy. This controversy is
described by Russell Weigley, the respected military historian, as follows:
The great structural question throughout most of the history of Ameri-
can military policy was that of the proper form of military organization
in a democratic society, approached through the running debate over
the proper weights to give to citizen-soldiers and military professionals
in the armed forces of the United States. [Ref. 14:p. XX]
B. BACKGROUND
The United States has always remained loyal to the notion of the
"minuteman," a citizen ready to bear arms in a time of crisis. In fact, the
American and French revolutions are credited with introducing the concept of
"participation in armed conflict [as] an integral aspect of the normative defi-
nition of citizenship." [Ref. 4:p. 75] Historically, Americans have honored that
military-citizenship connection during wartime. In fact, democracies, with
their political fervor, are said to excel best in the fighting of an all-out war
[Ref. l:p. 114]. It is the absence of a clear warfighting objective that leads
many Americans to question the need for compulsory service.
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This chapter now turns to the ideological considerations that have
shaped our views of military service. Major episodes in American military
history are then discussed in an effort to understand how Americans have
traditionally reconciled these conflicting ideological positions with the concept
of military service.
C. LIBERALISM
The fact that "liberalism has always been the dominant ideology in the
United States" [Ref. 19:p. 143] has complicated America's views towards mili-
tary service. Liberalism, which is characterized by devotion to individual
liberties, civil control of the military, and aversion to standing armies, does
not offer ideological guidance for the creation of a strong defense policy. [Ref.
12:p. 57]
Typically, Americans have been able to temper their natural tendencies
towards liberalism with a realistic stance on national defense. This realism is
exemplified by the country's persistent attempts to strike a balance between
the professional and citizen-soldier concepts. [Ref. 14:p. 134]
American political and social practicality, combined with its uniquely
Anglo-Saxon affinity for volunteerism, have helped offset liberalism and pro-
vide tools with which to develop military policy [Ref. l:p. 139]. This prac-
tically is manifested by the willingness to strike a political compromise and,
in times of crisis, to sacrifice personal needs and liberties for the preservation
of the nation. [Ref. 12:p. 57]
Perhaps, as scholars have observed, Americans have reconciled the
ideals of liberalism with the needs for a strong wartime military. Yet, the
controversy surrounding efforts to reinstate a peacetime draft, demonstrate
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the fundamental incompatibility of liberal politics with compulsory service
[Ref. l:p. 134]
1. The Legacy of Liberalism
Samuel Huntington, in his famous work, The Soldier and the State,
explains the durability of liberalism by asserting its persistence "was the
product not of inheritance [from the British], but of economic expansion and
international isolation." [Ref. 19:p. 145] Unlike this nation's European coun-
terparts, the United States has not had to confront radical political theories
brought on by class struggle. The United States has been able to achieve
social peace, not by military force, but by allowing its citizens to gain from an
ever-growing economy. As a result of economic expansion, the United States
has rarely had to grapple with the proper role of a military force in a demo-
cratic society. In addition, people believed geographic isolation shielded the
nation from foreign intervention and thus eliminated the need for a strong
army. [Ref. 19:pp. 144-145]
Liberalism's inability to understand the military function has
resulted in a historical neglect of a coherent military strategy. Prior to 1950,
with the exception of the naval strategies of Alfred Thayer Mahan, American
strategic writers tended to focus upon the proper role of the citizen and pro-
fessional soldier and ignored questions concerning the army's overall purpose.
[Ref. 14:pp. XIV, XX]
2. Conscription's Reconciliation With Liberalism
Traditionally, advocates of conscription have attempted to reconcile
the liberal concept of individual choice with the requirements for mandatory
service in a number of ways. One view draws an analogy between compulsory
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military service and a citizen's obligation to pay taxes or to attend school.
However, opponents to this point of view argue that paying taxes and attend-
ing school are far different from serving in the military, since they do not
involve the risk of one's life. [Ref. l:p. 139]
Advocates of the draft also claim that political leadership has an
inherent right to force citizens to serve in the military, whenever it sees the
need for such service. According to this argument, since the leaders of a
country represent the interests of all citizens in a democracy, a political deci-
sion to require military service is legitimate and does not violate the ideologi-
cal constraints of a liberal society. [Ref. ll:p. 69]
As Huntington observes, America's devotion to liberalism heightens
the controversy surrounding military duty. [Ref. 19:p. 143] The remainder of
the chapter traces this country's military experiences to determine how the
United States has typically addressed conflicting views of military service.
D. THE EARLY AMERICAN MILITARY EXPERIENCE
1. The Limits of European Influence
Chapter II outlined the social and political factors that shaped the
organization of European military forces. These experiences were drawn
upon, as this nation's earliest leaders tried to fashion military policy.
Although the lessons learned from the development of Western European
armies were instructive, they were not the only influence on the American
approach to war. From the beginning, America's war for survival dictated
different military objectives [Ref. 14:p. 19]. This is in contrast with prevailing
European methods, designed to preserve the existing social order. As pre-
viously observed, seventeenth-century Europe was characterized by dynastic
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rulers who maintained a rigid social structure. Leaders of this period were
bound by honor and tradition to maintain the social and political order
created by their ancestors. Wars were waged by these rulers not so much to
destroy their opponents, but to gain a particular advantage. The extent to
which resources were used in combat were constrained by a desire to main-
tain the current political and social system. As a result, European warfare in
the century prior to the French Revolution is characterized as limited. [Ref.
14:p. 18]
The determination to maintain an aristocratic social system differ-
entiates the European techniques for warfighting from the American
approach during this period. While European dynastic rulers sought to
preserve their aristocratic existence, seventeenth-century American Indian
fighters were attempting to control new lands and carve out a new way of life.
The Indian wars were "total," since they truly were wars of survival. Indeed,
"in King Philip's War of 1675-1676, the Indians came fearfully close to oblit-
erating the New England settlements." [Ref. 14:p. 19]
2. The Armed Citizenry
The seventeenth-century Indian wars played an important role in
shaping the early American approach to military service. Achieving victory in
a war of this type required the arming of all able citizens. One of the most
enduring of American military traditions was born: the concept of an armed
citizenry, or "citizen-soldiers."
The early successes enjoyed by these armed citizen-soldiers resulted
in a feeling of invincibility. The might of the armed citizenry became almost
mythical, and Americans became convinced "their country needed no
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professional army, because American citizens could whip any professional
soldiers on earth." [Ref. 3:p. 8] This perception of the absolute invincibility of
an armed citizenry complicated Washington's efforts to form a professional
force, and it continues to affect public attitudes toward defense needs to this
day.
E. THE REVOLUTIONARYYEARS
Popular legend depicts the American Revolution as a war fought and
won with a patriotic, armed citizenry. In reality, the war was won with disci-
plined regulars, professional soldiers trained in European drill and tactics.
This trained fighting force was the result of early decisions of
...Washington and the cautious men who shared military leadership
with him [placing] their principle military reliance not on a mass rising
but on the hope of building a professional army comparable to the
armies of Great Britain and France. [Ref. 3:p. 4]
Weigley suggests that traditional military forces were used because the
American Revolution was in most ways a "traditional" type of war. He points
out that, unlike the French Revolution which was to follow, the colonists' fight
for freedom was not a war seeking to tear down a political way of life. The
American Revolution "desired only independence and self-government, not an
upheaval toppling established patters of lift." [Ref. 3:p. 4]
Washington sought to wage a "traditional" war by creating a "European-
style" army. His army was different from the usual European professional
force, however, in that it sought to capitalize on the political energies of
future revolutionary armies. Officers were trained in the traditional military
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methods; but they were also drawn from the same social strata as the rank
and file, thus promoting positive morale.
F. BEYOND THE REVOLUTION
1. The Debate Begins
With the war for Independence won, the young country began to
debate identical issues of military organization that are still being discussed
today: what should be the proper balance that a democratic government
should strike between a professional and citizen-supported fighting force?
The discussion was influenced by two conflicting military legacies
drawn from the Revolution. The war had been fought and won with two
different military strategies: a traditional, conservative approach and a radi-
cal, revolutionary method. The conservative approach resulted in the forma-
tion of trained, professional soldiers. At the same time, the revolutionary tact
called for the arming of the citizenry and the creation of a nation-in-arms.
Both strategies contributed to the overall success of the war, a fact that has
often been overlooked by post-war debaters. [Ref. 3:p. 8-9] More often than
not, little common ground could be drawn between the advocates of either
view, because "those two favored one method often saw little merit in the
other." [Ref. 3:p. 9]
2. A Proper Balance
George Washington and the Professional Force
General Washington had served as the professional soldier's
strongest advocate during the American Revolution. However, following the
war, political and social realities forced Washington to temper his views and
"endorse a popular militia and the principle of a nation in arms." [Ref. 3:p. 11]
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Washington realized that the challenges of maintaining a standing
army after the revolution were enormous. Achieving freedom had severely
taxed the military sentiments of a population now intent on preserving their
hard-won independence. The government's funds, as well as its political
influence, were extremely limited, making a professional force highly imprac-
tical. More important, the sentiments against a standing force remained
extremely high. [Ref. 14:p. 41] To many Americans, fielding a force of profes-
sional soldiers was too "British." In addition, many individuals questioned the
wisdom of suffering through a revolution only to recreate a climate of military
domination [Ref. 3:p. 17].
A widespread feeling of military invincibility strengthened the
commitment of America's founding fathers to an armed citizenry instead of a
standing army. In the eyes of these Americans, the notion of bearing arms
was a matter of duty not of privilege. Furthermore, they believed an armed
populace was the best defense against tyrannical government as well as
foreign intervention. For these reasons, Americans chose to overlook Wash-
ington's criticisms of an untrained militia. Rather, they elected to believe that
an army of average citizens had defeated the world's most powerful nation.
[Ref. 3:p. 18]
Washington still sought to create a small standing army of 2,631
officers and enlisted men, supplemented by a militia of citizen-soldiers. He
did not believe such a military could compete with the more professional
European forces. Instead, Washington planned to draw upon the energy of the
citizenry in a time of national crisis. According to Washington:
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It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system,
that every Citizen who enjoys the protection of a free Government,
owes not only a proportion of his property, but even of his personal ser-
vices to the defence of it. [Ref. 3:p. 12]
Supporters of conscription often called upon Washington's words to
demonstrate that America's forefathers were devoted to a citizen-soldier
fighting force. In reality, Washington would later qualify his views regarding
the merits of a militia, stating that he
...glided almost insensibly into what I thought would, rather than
what I conceived ought to be a proper peace Establishment for this
Country. [Ref. 3:p. 13]
3. Alexander Hamilton
Edward Meed Earle writes that Alexander Hamilton "probably did
more than any other single person to formulate the early national policies of
the United States." [Ref. 20:p. 231] Much of Hamilton's life was spent lobby-
ing for a professional fighting force. Hamilton's devotion to a standing army
was based on his recognition of the connection between "commercial, financial
and industrial strength on the one hand, and political and military strength
on the other." [Ref. 20:p. 217] In his Report on Manufacturers, printed in
1791, Hamilton offers his views on a wide range of political, economic, and
military topics. Hamilton believed that economic power was the key to the
country's success and would serve to cement the country's diverse regional
interests. A strong economy, in Hamilton's view, would be able to supply a
strong military. A strong military would, in turn, allow the country to "choose
peace or war as our interest guided by justice shall dictate." [Ref. 20:p. 238]
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4. Universal Liability to Service
The passage of the Militia Act of 1792 codified the government's
decision to use an "armed citizenry" instead of a professional military. The act
called for universal military service by all able-bodied men between the ages
of 18 and 60. At first glance, it appeared that the concept of universal service
would apply to all sectors of early American society. In reality, class privilege
came into play, even at this early point in the country's history. Failure to
drill at muster resulted in a monetary fine. A fine, as it turned out, that only
the more affluent could afford to pay [Ref. 3:p. 38].
5. The Military as a Necessity for National Defense
The passage of the Militia Act actually provided an opportunity for
Washington and Alexander Hamilton to launch a counterattack. In their
efforts to renew interest in a professional force, these two men would change
the fundamental manner in which Congress viewed the use of armed force.
[Ref. 14:p. 22] Prior to the French Revolution, American political leadership
viewed the military as a police force, organized to control border conflicts with
Indian fighters. The increase in France's military power and political adven-
turism following the 1789 revolution began to reshape the American view.
Increasingly, France became viewed as a threat to the new world. Alexander
Hamilton took stock of world events and convinced Congress that the United
States' military was no match for the well-disciplined French force. As a
result of his efforts, Congress began to view the army as a necessity for
defense against foreign invaders. Hamilton took advantage of this new out-
look by proposing the use of a standing army, supported by an easily expand-
able force of militiamen. [Ref. 3:p. 23]
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6. The Citizen-Soldier
Thomas Jefferson's plan for the nation's military reflected his
strong belief in the importance of the citizen-soldier. In his eyes, "a well-disci-
plined militia [is] our best reliance in peace, and for the first moments of
war." [Ref. 3:p. 27] It is important to note that Jefferson intended to create a
nation of soldiers rather than an unarmed state. "Every citizen a soldier" [Ref.
19:p. 4] is a Jeffersonian concept. Although Jefferson opposed a large stand-
ing army, he still believed the young country should have a well-trained force.
Under the Jefferson administration, the United States Military Academy
(West Point), was created.
7. West Point
West Point during the 1880's reflected the general view that an
officer should be well-schooled in scientific principles. Borrowing heavily from
Jomini, West Point stressed technical and scientific skills in war. Rather than
being identified as a military school, West Point became recognized as one of
the foremost civil engineering schools in the country. Weigley observes that
West Point had to turn to engineering excellence as a means of self-defense:
In a country not immediately imperiled by foreign enemies and jealous
of standing armies, the academy had to justify itself by preparing offi-
cers who could do useful work in peace, so it became largely a school of
civil engineering. [Ref. 14 :p. 8]
Other scholars offer other reasons for the engineering focus. Mili-
tary strategy at this time demanded the construction of coastal forts to ensure
seaboard defense.
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E. THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
1. The War of 1812
The war of 1812 is considered by some to have been nothing more
than an attempt by the United States to expand its revolution and acquire
control of Canada and the Floridas [Ref. 12:p. 48]. Regardless of the intent of
the conflict, it served to foreshadow the government's future difficulties with
conscription and also demonstrated the problems that can be encountered
when a nation's political goals do not match its military organization [Ref.
14:p. 46].
The proponents of a citizen-soldier militia were committed to an
economical, defense-oriented military structure. Indeed, this system, more
than any other, guaranteed economy and civil control. What the system did
not provide was a means of effectively waging an offensive conflict, such as
the war of 1812. In fact, the separation of civil-military control during this
period resulted in the political leadership's failure to communicate the
government's military objectives to the military leadership. [Ref. 14:pp. 46-47]
President Madison's request for the authority to draft 400,000 men
marked the United States' first attempt to use conscription. The request was
never formally answered because the war ended while the bill was still being
debated in Congress. [Ref. 12:p. 48]
2. The Pre-Civil War Years
In the years preceding the Civil War, government policy toward the
military was characterized by indifference. There was no identifiable threat to
the country, and the nation's principal defenders, the militia, were allowed to
degenerate into little more than social clubs. [Ref. 19:p. 202] As a result of
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the apparent federal disinterest, the small cadre of professional officers began
to distance itself from the civilian sector. This withdrawal produced an officer
corps that was unprepared for the tremendous demands of the Civil War.
West Pointers of this period were highly trained in the narrow technical
aspects of artillery and fortification, but were unfamiliar with the require-
ments for leading an armed citizenry (a type of soldiering they viewed with
contempt). [Ref. 3:p. 76]
a. Southern Military Tradition
Although most sectors of the nation viewed the military with
apathy and indifference, the Southern states did develop a strong military
tradition of service. This was the result of the South's unique need for defense
against the Indians as well as the prevalent fear of slave revolts. In addition,
the South's interest in military tradition reflected the conservative leanings of
its residents. [Ref. 19:pp. 211-212]
3. The Civil War
The enormous difference between the approaches of the North and
South to civil-military relations became obvious in the early days of the Civil
War. While the North chose to draw its military leadership from the civilian
sector, Southern states turned to the military professional. In fact, 64 percent
of regular Southern army officers became generals, compared with 30 percent
of Northern army officers. [Ref. 19:p. 213]
The Civil War propelled the Northern and Southern armies into a
new type of conflict; that being a war whose purpose was the total destruction
of the enemy. As Grant's "semi-official biographer" [Ref. 14:p. 150] observed:
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It was indispensable to annihilate armies, and resources; to place every
rebel force where it had no alternative but destruction or submission.
[Ref. 14:p. 128]
Such a war would require the United States to call upon, for the first time,
the concepts of a mass army and nationalism that were born of the French
Revolution. [Ref. 14:pp. XXI, 132]
By definition, a mass army must field many soldiers. Initially, the
North depended upon the strong, voluntary ethic that is part of the liberal
outlook to provide the necessary manpower. For, although "liberal states find
military compulsion repugnant..., at the same time they elevate the virtues of
military volunteerism." [Ref. 12:p. 137] At the beginning of the war, volun-
teerism did provide the required amount of manpower. As the war continued,
however, desertion, disease, and casualties prompted a reluctant President
Lincoln to initiate the nation's first draft law, the Enrollment Act of 1863.
[Ref. 12:p. 49]
4. Lincoln and Conscription
Lincoln made no effort to attach any cloak ofjustice to the draft. He
deemed it "involuntary servitude," and said:
You who do not wish to be soldiers, do not like this law. This is natural;
nor does it imply want of patriotism. [Ref. l:pp. 138-139]
Lincoln's distaste for the draft is evidenced by his views on substi-
tution and commutation. He believed that the basic principles of commutation
(where a fee is paid to the government) and substitution (where a draftee can
hire a replacement) were a "good thing," [Ref. l:p. 143] even though they
resulted in four-fifths of draftees avoiding service. [Ref. l:p. 143] Public dis-
satisfaction with the draft resulted in serious rioting and violence in several
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cities. The strength of public resistance eventually required the imprisonment
of dissenters and the subsequent removal of the right of habeas corpus.
Clearly, the nation was yet to determine a socially-acceptable means of field-
ing a mass army. [Ref. 12:p. 49]
5. "Business Pacifism"
The years following the Civil War were characterized by "the com-
plete, unrelenting hostility of virtually all of the American community toward
virtually all things military." [Ref. 19:p. 227] Some historians characterize
this period as the lowest period in this country's military history, while others
say it is a period in which America's professional corps came into being [Ref.
19:p. 229].
The social philosophy of the period was dominated by the concept of
"business pacifism," which viewed a military institution as its natural enemy.
Huntington calls it the "only explicit theory of civil-military relations
produced by American liberalism." [Ref. 19:p. 222] Business pacifists were
strongly committed to capitalism as the cure to world problems. In their eyes,
countries were being so closely joined by economic interests that the thought
of jeopardizing these interests by armed conflict was unthinkable. To these
individuals, war was evil and, even worse, wasteful. Moreover, war fighters
destroyed the fruits of capitalism and then lived off the labors of society when
the war was over. [Ref. 19:pp. 220-224]
6. Emory Upton
In response to the civil community's animosity, the army withdrew
to develop its own brand of military professionalism. Emory Upton became
one of the principal champions of the military professional's cause. Upton's
37
book, The Military Policy of the United States, was published during this post-
war period and is still considered a classic study ofAmerican military history
[Ref. 3:p. 109]. The basic premise of the book voiced "the feelings of many
professionals that the regular army must be the center of American military
planning." [Ref. 3:p. 109] Upton sought to base the structure of the armed
forces on the concept of an expendable army, first articulated by Alexander
Hamilton. The program, which called for a large regular force to be aug-
mented by conscripts in wartime, never gained popular acceptance.
The reasons why Upton's plan failed to gain broad political support
are still relevant. As Weigley observes, Upton attempted to fit American
society into a particular mold of military service, rather than reshaping the
armed forces to fit prevailing social beliefs [Ref. 3:p. 110]. Weigley concludes:
Apparently [Upton] did not reflect that the best means of establishing
an effective American military policy might be to study American
society at large and to fashion military institutions within its frame-
work. [Ref. 3:p. 110]
7. Altered Military-Civil Relations
This military leadership's withdrawal signaled yet another fun-
damental change in the country's civil-military relations. Prior to the Civil
War, the values of the nation and its officers were mainly the same. Although
the military did tend to lean toward a conservative ideology, the beliefs of its
members were championed by the South, which also shared in the army's
conservative outlook. With the demise of the South and the rise of pacifism,
the army became even more conservative and isolated as society chose to
follow a more liberal path. [Ref. 19:p. 257]
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F. THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY
1. World War I
World War I marked the end of the government's reliance on volun-
teerism to provide wartime manpower. With the passage of the 1917 Selective
Service Act, conscription became the official policy for manning the armed
forced. Passage of the act was accompanied by significant public debate.
Opponents of conscription said it was "not democratic, it is autocratic...it is
despotic [it is] involuntary servitude." [Ref. 12:p. 50] Advocates countered by
stating that "volunteering is haphazard, inefficient, disruptive of industrial
and economic stability, wasteful, and operatively unequal in spreading the
obligations of citizenship." [Ref. 12:p 51]
It is curious that the method in which World War I draftees were
classified could be considered a more equal sharing of the military obligation.
Male registrants were classified Category I through V, depending upon their
worth (usually economic) to the civilian sector. Category I individuals were
the least valued, so they were drafted first. Such a system, by its very compo-
sition, favored the more affluent members of society or those with more
opportunity to be of greater "value" to society. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the World War I draft system was overrepresentative of the poor and
blacks. Indeed, while 9.6 percent of draft registrants were black, the induction
figure stood at 13 percent. [Ref. 12:p. 51]
2. World War II
World War II had a major impact on American civil-military rela-
tions. During this conflict, massive mobilization of the population caused an
intermingling of professional military and civilian factions. In the process,
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military leaders were required to take on more of a national, political outlook,
and join the country's ideological mainstream. [Ref. 19:p. 315]
Many liberals held a fundamental aversion to war; yet, during this
national crisis, they chose to place the responsibilities of combat with the
experts. National energies and resources were fully engaged to win the war.
For the moment, the goals of the military and civilian community were one.
[Ref. 19:p. 317]
a. Conscription
The legislation required to reinstate the selective service sys-
tem was supported by the same arguments made to promote the World War I
draft. While draft supporters sought to draw from the previous war's man-
power mistakes and devise a coordinated plan to service both military and
production needs, the opponents of conscription replayed the usual stance
towards military service. The opinion of those opposed to conscription is
captured in the words of Senator Robert Taft of Ohio:
The draft...is absolutely opposed to the principles of individual liberty
which have always been considered a part of American democracy.
[Ref. 12:p. 53]
Taft's remarks were made in 1940, and were soon forgotten
with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941. One week after the Japanese
attack, the ages for draft eligibility were extended from 18-31 years to 18-44
years. In 1943, to better control direct defense and industrial needs, volun-
teers were not longer accepted. This action institutionalized conscription, for
the time being, as an American way of life. [Ref. 12:p. 54]
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Except for a short period immediately following World War II,
conscription remained in effect until it was replaced by the All-Volunteer
Force in 1973. Although draft supporters continually stress conscription's
appeal to traditional values, the Civil War, World War I, World War II and
the 29 years or so that followed are the only episodes in which this country
has maintained a conscripted force.
3. Post-War Military-Civil Relations
The United States emerged from World War II with a fundamen-
tally changed view of the world. The Cold War forced civilian leaders to
recognize "military requirements [as] a fundamental ingredient of foreign
policy." [Ref. ll:p. 345] This realistic view of the world did not end the con-
troversy surrounding the military's "proper" place in society, but rather
"heightened...peacetime tension between military imperatives and American
liberal society." [Ref. ll:p. 345] Post-World War II Americans may have
accepted a peacetime military as "necessary," but they were not yet ready to
consider it desirable.
4. Executive Order 9981
The post-World War II period also produced a fundamental change
in the government's position on equal opportunity in the armed forces. In
1948 President Truman issued Executive Order 9981. The act stated:
...that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all
persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or
national origin. [Ref. ll:p. 86]
The act had a far-reaching effect on the military as well as the nation. In fact,
racial representation issues are still being addressed.
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5. The Korean War
Unlike World War II, this country entered the Korean war with a
draft system in place. The first part of the Korean war was fought with
reservists, however, because, although draft registration was required, no one
had been drafted since 1949. By 1952 draftees were shouldering the burden of
the war.
Public dismay with the Korean war was equal to that evidenced
during the Vietnam war, but it lacked the social resistance that characterized
the later conflict. Public acceptance, however reluctant, was buttressed by the
Cold War, the nature of the conflict, and by "the general acceptance of the
draft...." [Ref. l:p. 195] This "general acceptance" disintegrated with
Vietnam.
6. Vietnam
Scholars are still attempting to assess the full impact of the Viet-
nam war on the United States and its people. Despite the continuing contro-
versy, two points do arise from the war's legacy:
• the war completely altered the popular perception of military
service [Ref. 10:pp. 50-57]
• conscripts may not be well suited for the fighting of limited,
political wars [Ref. l:p. 115].
a. Military Service
It has been said that the concept of civic virtue, the willingness
of citizens to bear arms for the state, was "mindlessly, mendaciously, unfor-
givably squandered in Vietnam." [Ref. 10:p. 50] Whether the patriotism
defining a citizen-soldier has been irreparably damaged remains to be seen.
However, it can be said that widespread dissatisfaction with the conduct of
42
the war and its draft contributed to the demise of the Selective Service system
and the creation of the All-Volunteer military. [Ref. 4:pp. 248-249]
b. Conscripts and Political Wars
Modern democracies are ill-suited for the fighting of political
wars that have limited scope. This is due to the post-World War II erosion of
nationalism. As a result of this erosion, men in democratic nations have
increasingly based their willingness to fight on the moral purposes of the
conflict. [Ref. 4:p. 243] The fighting of such conflicts are better left to a small
cadre of professional soldiers who can weather a limited war's lengthy dura-
tion. France recognized this fact when fighting in Indochina; our experiences
in Vietnam suggest that America has not. [Ref. 10 :p. 5]
G. SUMMARY
This chapter shows liberalism, the dominant American political philoso-
phy, is resistant to the ideal of compulsory peacetime military service. This
chapter also indicates the United States has struggled with the "proper" sys-
tem of military service since revolutionary times. It appears that drawing
upon earlier military experiences will not predict present-day reaction to the
idea of a new draft. Chapter IV will survey modern issues in an effort to
answer the draft acceptability question.
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IV. THE MODERN DEBATE
We unanimously believe that the nation's interests will be better
served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective stand-by
draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts [Ref.
12:p. 106]
President's Commission on
An All-Volunteer Force, 1970
An all-volunteer army would do serious injury to our national character
because it would restrict service to those who make a career of the
Army. One of the intangible things that makes citizenship understand-
able is that a multitude ofAmericans serve a short time in our military
forces and then return to civilian life. This dual role places military and
civilian responsibilities in a balanced perspective in our national life.
[Ref. 7:p. 257]
Senator Sam J. Erwin, Jr., 1971
Throughout its history, the United States has struggled to balance its
political and social needs and still maintain an effective system for rilling the
military's ranks. As Huntington observes, the basic issue remains:
How can a liberal society provide for its military security when this
requires the maintenance of professional military forces and institu-
tions fundamentally at odds with liberalism? [Ref. 19:p. 356]
A. THE CONTROVERSY OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE
Quantitatively-based analytical techniques have dominated both the
creation and the subsequent monitoring of the AVF. This statement is
supported by the most often cited criticism of the President's Commission on
an All-Volunteer Armed Force (or "Gates Commission"), the group tasked
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with determining the feasibility of ending the draft. Specifically, the accusa-
tion is that "the Commission focused almost solely on pay and economics, to
the exclusion of other, equally important considerations." [Ref. 12:p. 106]
Commission supporters are quick to point out that the main objective was to
assess the economic considerations of establishing all-voluntary recruiting
[Ref. 12:p. 107]. As a result, according to Cooper (author of the influential,
Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force), "The social scientists did not
play a particularly significant role in the debate or in the solution of the draft
issue." [Ref. 12:p. 38]
In 1986 John Kester, writing in support of a return to the draft, observed
that "what makes sense in narrow economic terms sometimes is not consis-
tent with overall national security." [Ref. 6:p. 289] This thought, together
with Senator Ervin's comments regarding citizen responsibility, illustrates
some of the ideological concerns held by the critics of the AVF. What follows is
an outline of the major issues that dominate current discussion of the citizen
versus professional soldier debate.
1. The Fusion of a Government and Its People
Clausewitz points to the fusion of the government, the army, and
the people as the key to defense effectiveness. It is this joining of the people's
will with the army's might and the government's purpose that provides
defense strength and military power. Thoughtful observers might question
whether an army composed of only a narrow sector of society is properly
harnessing the potential energy described in Clausewitz's triad.
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The declining number of Congressmen who have served in the
armed forces runs counter to the Clausewitzian view of closely knit civil-mili-
tary relations. Thirty years ago almost all Congressmen (as a result of World
War II) were veterans. More recently, the figures are 45 percent for the House
and 69 percent in the Senate; and all indications are that the proportions will
continue to decline. [Ref. 6:p. 304] Supporters of a draft are troubled by this
decline in military experience because, as some scholars have observed, a
leadership elite (like the Congress), lacking military experience will con-
tribute to the isolation of the armed forces from society [Ref. 9:p. 245].
2. Society's Call to Serve
Open political systems typically are faced with a dilemma: on the
one hand they attempt to ensure that individuals are allowed freedom of
choice; at the same time, they must preserve this freedom of choice with a
strong military presence that may require a call to arms. Philosophers have
sanctioned society's right to compromise individual choice for the purpose of
national defense in different ways.
a, John Locke
John Locke, writing nearly three-hundred years ago, intro-
duced the concept of the social contract. According to Locke, there exists a
political contract that ties a government and its people. Individual citizens
ratify the contract by remaining a member of the political community and
accepting the benefits of that community. Support for the government is
demonstrated by obeying the government's laws. [Ref. 10:pp. 34-35] Believers
in the military-citizenship connection claim that a natural extension of
Locke's concept is the idea that
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...military service flows naturally from residence, from acceptance of
benefits, and from obedience to the laws, including those laws which
determine who shall serve, for how long, where, when, and why. [Ref.
10:p. 35]
b. Thomas Hobbes
Thomas Hobbes, a contemporary of Locke's, took a different
approach. According to Hobbes, societies are created out ofmans need for self-
preservation [Ref. 10 :p. 42] In his view, the sole purpose of society is protec-
tion. As a result, no society can subject its citizens to fear or risk of life except
in the case of military service. Military duty is considered different because
. . .when the defense of the Commonwealth requires at once the help of
all that are able to bear arms, everyone is obliged; because otherwise
the institution of the Commonwealth, which they have not the purpose,
or the courage to protect was in vain. [Ref. 10:p. 42]
c. William Blackstone
The British legal philosopher, William Blackstone, offered a
succinct summary of society's right to demand military dues. Blackstone's
support for the citizen-soldier concept was based on the view that a person
does not stop being a citizen when he (or she) becomes a soldier but becomes a
soldier because he is a citizen [Ref. l:p. 123].
3. The Erosion of Popular Acceptance of a Call to Arms
a. The Military Claim
How can a democracy sanction a government program that
effectively denies individuals the right to choose, even if only for a short, pre-
determined period, their place of residence, their occupation, their working
relationships, their manner of dress, their leisure pursuits, and their level of
pay? Gold provides the answer by writing that the military claim is
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...the legal demand which a democratic state, acting as the agent of its
citizenry, may make upon that citizenry for service under arms in war
and peace. [Ref. 10 :p. 4]
For the most part, Americans have traditionally viewed this military claim as
a just claim. The view has served to ease the social fallout created by the call
to military service. However, in this century, popular acceptance has faltered
to such a degree that
...for a generation now, the military claim has been commonly viewed
as the essentially amoral...demand which the state makes upon an
indifferent, alienated, or antagonistic citizenry. [Ref. 10:p. 4]
b. Nationalism
Linking ones personal well-being with the government's sur-
vival is the basis of nationalism. Janowitz uses the concept of nationalism to
explain public acceptance of a call to arms. He also observes that nationalism,
as "a rationale for universal military service, has suffered an important
erosion." [Ref. 4:p. 245] He attributes this erosion to a number of factors.
Today's military-eligible population is far removed from the military
achievements of World War II (the last indisputably victorious war). Instead
of focusing on the "good" that resulted from America's winning war effort,
young people tend to focus on the utter destruction caused by the conflict [Ref.
4:p. 245]. As a result, war and nationalism (its social base) are increasingly
viewed as evil. The growth in literacy, the rise in unemployment compensa-
tion and social security programs, increased exposure of college students to
"radical" ideas, and the "hedonism and the importance of self-expression"
[Ref. 4:p. 245] have also served to weaken the call to military service. [Ref.
4:p. 245]
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c. Channelling
The channelling policy used during the Vietnam era draft also
contributed to the erosion of the "military claim." Between 1955 and 1975, the
number of military-eligible young men more than doubled [Ref. 12:p. 40].
Even with the demands of the Vietnam war, only 40 percent of the Vietnam-
era, draft-eligible young men ever served [Ref. l:p. 163]. (Contrast this figure
with 70 percent ofmen who had served in 1958.) [Ref. l:p. 163] To cope with
the great excess of available manpower during this period, the Selective Ser-
vice System began granting deferments and instituted the policy of
"channelling." The Director of the Selective Service System defined chan-
nelling as
That process through which registrants are influenced to enter and
remain in study, critical occupations, and in other activities in the
national health, safety, and interest by deferment or prospect for
deferment from military service. [Ref. l:p. 163]
This policy favored individuals who were able to attend college, shifting the
burden of military service to the less fortunate. Channelling compromised the
moral legitimacy of military service because it became viewed by government
officials as "a useful threat rather than as an appeal to honor and duty." [Ref.
l:p. 164] Channelling, with its related deferments, would come to be viewed
as highly unfair. Indeed, according to Cooper, "the equity issue...became the
single most important factor in the move to end the draft." [Ref. 12:p. 40]
These factors, combined with the elimination of the draft, help explain why
certain segments of American society are opting to ignore the military and
shun the "military claim."
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4. The All-Volunteer Force
The quantitative approach to the organization of the armed forces
changed the way government policies addressed military service. The Gates
Commission observed that "conscription is a form of taxation, the power to
conscript is the power to tax." [Ref. l:p. 167] Thus, manpower became viewed
as another resource for the military, another investment to be purchased
along with tanks and battleships [Ref. l:p. 168]. One scholar observes that
the Commission projects the appearance of the view that "there is nothing
elevated about military service, or indeed any kind of national service." [Ref.
l:p. 168] With the "economic" approach, manpower issues were driven by the
level of pay needed to attract the necessary numbers of qualified "volunteers"
as opposed to the values of civic duty and responsibility.
a. Institution Versus Occupation
The use of a market-based recruiting system further compro-
mises the concept of citizen responsibility. Unlike the deeply-rooted appeal to
the traditional values of civic duty, the AVF depends heavily upon monetary
incentives to attract and retain personnel. Currently, the armed forces, rather
than being viewed as a traditional "rite of passage," have evolved into another
career option
—
just one of many job opportunities. This view is captured in
the "institution versus occupation model" developed by Charles C. Moskos.
[Ref. 5:p. 131]
5. Representation
The representation issue is based on the belief that, in a democratic
society, government agencies should reflect the values and opinions of the
people [Ref. 8:p. 1-2]. Also basic is the belief that, in a society not requiring
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military service by everyone, equity is achieved only when those who do serve
represent a broad cross section of the eligible pool [Ref. 8:p. 1-3]. In addition,
it is felt that all citizens must shoulder an equal share of the country's
defense requirements [Ref. 7:p. 27].
The United States military has never been a statistically repre-
sentative, demographic image of the country [Ref. 8:p. IV-2]. To this day, a
clear policy does not exist as to what constitutes "desirable" broad-based
representation.
6. Defense Effectiveness
The lack of representation policy is evidenced by the Defense
Department's recruiting objectives. The military services seek to organize the
most effective fighting force. This is accomplished by recruiting the most
qualified individuals without reference to "representative" demographic
qualities. Admittedly, this type of recruiting does not lead to broad-based
representation. What it does achieve, however, is a military force composed of
the best applicants from the available pool, something most "analysts agree is
beneficial to the Nation's defense." [Ref. 8:p. IV-3]
7. The Military as a Social Institution
This "best force possible" concept is countered by the unique status
of the American peacetime military. One scholar observes, "as a public
agency, the military cannot ignore overall societal responsibilities as long as
these activities are not contrary to the defense mission." [Ref. 7:p. 59] In fact,
in peacetime, the armed forces are often viewed more as a political, rather
than a military institution. For this reason, individuals are willing to "accept
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penalties in military efficiency in order to preserve military obligation as an
integral part of citizenship." [Ref. l:p. 68]
8. Benefit Versus Burdens
Building a statistical representation plan is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, because of differing interpretations of military service. Statistical data is
often brought out to show that one group or another is either underrepre-
sented or overrepresented in today's force [see, for example, Ref. 8]. Never-
theless, opinions concerning the need for representation often hinge upon
whether military duty is described as a "benefit" or a "burden." For example,
individuals viewing military service primarily as an undesirable "burden,"
claim that overrepresented groups are forced to shoulder more than their "fair
share" of defense responsibilities. At the same time, others may look at the
"technical training, education, social development,...mobility [and] job
experience" [Ref. 8:p. IV-3] offered by the military. In this light, military
service constitutes a "benefit," an opportunity for personal development and
economic progress. Individuals who believe in the "benefit" view question why
this path to upward mobility should be denied to any qualified applicant
based on demographic statistics.
9. A Cross-Section of Citizens
a. Minorities
Minority group membership is one of the most widely used
measures of social representation; and overrepresentation of blacks is often
cited as proof that the AVF has failed to draw from diverse segments of
society [Ref. 12:p. 209]. Indeed, as some writers have suggested, "the AVF is
not remotely representative of the United States." [Ref. 6:p. 297] This is
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ironic, since the AVF was created to correct "the historically unrepresentative
nature of the draft" [Ref. 12:p. 204].
Basically, the feeling is that the United States is a society that
has left "...its dirtiest fighting [to be] done by some of its least privileged
members." [Ref. 6:p. 298] If military service is considered a burden, the
argument may have some merit. A recent government study indicates that
racial/ethnic minorities constitute about 28.1 percent of new recruits, com-
pared with 18 percent of the youth population. [Ref. 8:p. 1-7]
10. Representation - A Dead Issue?
Recent public opinion polls indicate that Americans "are not gener-
ally concerned about the social composition of the current military." [Ref.
8:p. IV-5] In fact, as observed in Chapter I, 80 percent of Americans claim to
be completely satisfied with the current voluntary recruiting system. Per-
haps, in peacetime, those who ascribe to liberalism can accept a force that is
not entirely "representative" of the population as long as maintenance of such
a force does not jeopardize individual rights.
B. SUMMARY
This chapter demonstrates the variety and complexity of the issues that
form the contemporary "American" view of military service. The wide-range of
discussion raises the question whether any form of military service will
achieve universal popular support.
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V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the worst system of military service is that which changes
constantly....The difficult task, therefore is to devise a system that is
not merely fair and effective, but durable as well.
Elliott C. Cohen [Ref. l:p. 189]
A. THE MAJOR QUESTION
Chapter I asks: What is the political feasibility of a peacetime draft? This
work has sought to place this question within the framework of the philos-
ophical and historical issues that have helped to shape the nation's attitudes
towards military service. This chapter answers the question of peacetime
compulsory service, raises additional questions regarding military service,
and then discusses a possible solution to one of the major criticisms of the
AVF.
A major conclusion of the study is that political acceptability of a peace-
time draft in the United States is highly questionable. This finding is based
upon a variety of factors summarized below.
B. LIBERALISM
As discussed in Chapter III, the philosophy of liberalism has dominated
this nation's political thought since the American Revolution. Liberalism will
support the call to arms in time of crisis; but it remains generally devoted to
the ideal of individual choice in peacetime. The current voluntary system of
military manning preserves liberalism's tradition of individual choice. As a
result, the revival of a draft will most likely provoke unrestrained hostility
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among many in the country, especially the young and those who have a fading
memory of the draft that preceded the war in Vietnam.
1. Vietnam
The Vietnam experience made challenges to the post-World War II
draft socially acceptable, and perhaps, even socially desirable. Chapter III
cites Philip Gold's assessment of the Vietnam war's impact on public accep-
tance of the draft. Gold states the conflict destroyed America's dedication to
the notion of a citizen's unspoken responsibility to serve in the armed forces.
Gold's claim may be somewhat overstated. The Vietnam war did not eliminate
the patriotic desire to serve, but on another level the war did reinforce the
public's resistance to conscription.
2. Public Satisfaction With the AVF
It has been noted time and again that the American public is
pleased with the current system of military manning. Clearly, a peacetime
society, dominated by liberalism and registering a high level of satisfaction
with the current system will be reluctant to pursue other, less voluntary
options.
C. ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS
The bulk of controversy surrounding the All-Volunteer system is based
upon differing perceptions and value judgments. This situation obviously
avoids easy solutions. The following questions address some of the major
points that have dominated much of the AVF debate.
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1. A Citizen's Duty to Serve
What are the limits of a citizen's responsibility to defend his or her
country? Conscription advocates often respond to this question by referring to
the military-citizenship link.
a. Military-Citizenship Link
Chapter II traces the development of the military-citizenship
link. Machiavelli's view that a country's defense is the responsibility of all
citizens embodies the notion that military service is one of the requirements
of citizenship. Conscription advocates point to this service-citizenship tie; yet,
as discussed in Chapter IV, the government's call to military service is
increasingly viewed by the public as immoral and illegitimate. [Ref. 10:p.4]
(1) Discussion
Service to one's country is based upon an ideal of patrio-
tism. Draft supporters have seized this concept and interpreted it narrowly by
identifying the concept with a willingness to serve in the armed forces. While
military service is indeed a noble expression of patriotic virtue, there are
other ways of serving one's country. There are many socially beneficial public
service jobs that are characterized by low pay, long hours, and high level of
personal sacrifice. The belief that patriotism is manifested solely by military
service cheapens the contributions made by those who have served their
country in a civilian capacity.
The realities of a shrinking labor pool may also challenge
the military-citizenship link. In an economy struggling to remain competitive
in world markets, is military duty the most socially ideal option for all
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individuals? Perhaps individuals who opt out of military duty to seek civilian
opportunities are more valuable in that non-military capacity.
As mentioned in Chapter III, the Selective Service system
was employed in both World Wars to ensure a steady flow of manpower to
both the defense and manufacturing sector. Thus, even in a total war concept,
policy makers realized the imprudence of requiring all individuals to serve.
Would anyone question the patriotism of those who are charged with laboring
in the production sector of the economy?
Thoughtful observers must also challenge the need for
government leaders to possess military experience. At the highest levels of
government, officials competently address a myriad of social issues of which
they lack personal experience. Perhaps, in the purest of social systems,
governmental military experience is desirable. This nation exists in a less
than perfect world, however; so the question becomes whether this govern-
ment should compel people to serve to fulfill an unnecessary but somewhat
desirable social requirement.
2. Representation
Does the ideal of broad representation remain an important issue?
Discussions of representation issues are quite complicated because the very
concept of representation carries so many different meanings. To some
observers, the issue is dominated by the ideal of political legitimacy.
a. A Legitimate Force
Chapter I introduces the concept of "political legitimacy." Pro-
ponents of this philosophy believe that a force must be broadly representative
of society if the armed forces are to be considered a legitimate extension of the
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government. Individuals from this school point to the current force's racial
imbalance, and question its legitimacy as well as its reliability. To these indi-
viduals, a truly effective and reliable force should draw from a much wider
cross-section of individuals who have a stake in the nation's survival.
b. Clausewitz
Some scholars have referred to the teachings of Clausewitz to
address the representation issue. Chapter II discusses Clausewitz's belief in
the people's "passion" as a powerful strategic weapon. Opponents of a volun-
tary military fear that the AVF, which has yet to prove itself under combat
conditions, will be unable to effectively harness the country's political fervor.
c. Minorities
Race or ethnic background (as discussed in Chapter IV) is one
of the most widely cited representation measures. Many measures indicate
that the current force structure is "unrepresentative." The focus of discussion
concerns whether this imbalance should be allowed to continue.
(1) Discussion
The overrepresentation of minority groups at the expense
of white college-bound males, as discussed in Chapter I, brings into question
the ideological leanings of the AVF. It would appear that a force comprised of
the lower socioeconomic groups would have a different cultural frame of
reference than would the more affluent members of society. The thought of a
military system staffed by discontented soldiers is a sobering concept. As dis-
cussed in Chapter II, the political and military energy resulting from the
fusion of a government, a military, and its people is a precious and reliable
weapon. The questions of the need for ideological representation and whether
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the current force structure satisfies that need remain to be answered. Yet, it
would appear that the best system of military service would attract a broadly
representative cross-section of the country's citizens.
D. SILENCING CRITICISM OF THE AVF
The United States has spend over two-hundred years attempting to
devise a workable system of military service. In 1973, the All-Volunteer Force
was heralded as the answer to the problem of armed forces manning. With
minor changes, the voluntary force structure may very well be the answer.
The all-volunteer system depends upon market-based incentives to
attract recruits. Manpower analysts must once again turn to the forces of the
marketplace to attract the "right" kind of recruit. A definition of the "right"
type of recruit is a political decision and will not be defined here except to
state that, in a democracy, recruiting goals should strive to attract a socially
representative cross-section of the nation's youth.
Moskos and Faris [Ref. 5] reflect the views of many scholars in their
belief that educational benefits should be drastically upgraded to attract
college-bound youths. In an age of soaring college tuition, a generous educa-
tional assistance program could serve to pull quality recruits into military
service for limited periods. Enticing underrepresented youths into enlisting
achieves the goal of "proportional participation" without the negativism
attached to compulsory service.
Opponents of such a plan claim that short-service tours jeopardize the
career force, which is the backbone of defense. Moskos and Faris, address this
problem with their proposal of a dual path career track. [Ref. 5:pp. 143-146]
Under this plan, citizen-soldiers serve in low-level jobs for shorter periods at a
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reduced level of pay. This is done in exchange for generous educational bene-
fits at the completion of military service. Professional soldiers, on the other
hand, are channelled into "career" positions at a higher pay level.
E. SUMMARY
...the laws governing military recruitment are political institutions.
Elliott C. Cohen [Ref. l:p. 189]
This work began with a question: What is the political feasibility of a
peacetime draft? The answer was determined by examining society's political
and social institutions. Indeed the problems encountered by Emory Upton
(Chapter III) demonstrate the futility of attempting to develop public policy
outside of these institutions.
It seems highly likely that many American people will challenge the
revival of compulsory service. Perhaps this challenge is legitimate, because
with minor changes the current system can fulfill most of the ideals sought by
proponents of conscripted "citizen-soldiers."
It appears that the AVF was developed within the framework of Ameri-
can political and social custom. Perhaps, this is one reason the government
has finally been able to field what is widely considered the most effective
defense system in this nation's history. And it was accomplished without
threatening liberalism's devotion to the concept of individual choice. From a
political and social viewpoint, the current force manning policy makes sense.
The AVF, like any other public institution, cannot be expected to repre-
sent the perfect solution or one that will silence all critics. What it does
represent is an effective recruiting scheme for our time that can thrive in a
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liberal society. Fine tuning the current recruiting system to attract the
college-bound recruit will solidify society's support of the recruiting system,
because it will ensure a broad cross-section of Americans share a stake in its
continued success. Ideally, drawing individuals from all sectors of society will
tap the country's political will and allow ready access to the reservoir of polit-
ical fervor that is unique to citizen armies.
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